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Abstract
A.I., or Artificial Intelligence, is a vast field that includes more than the so-called "Expert
Systems" that the public seems to identify with A.I. In particular, research in A.I. has created
an entirely new mode of operating with computers which raises the level of abstraction at
which the computer user (and the programmer) interfaces with the computer, enabling
systematic and economical handling of high-complexity problems. These techniques are
particularly applicable to Air Traffic Control automation problems which exhibit a high
degree of complexity, such as system-wide simulation experiments, flow control procedures,
and tactical control supervision. In addition, specific A.I. techniques- such as Expert Systems
- have unique specific applications in ATC, for example Airport Runway Configuration
planning, passive visual radar, and others.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Flight Transportation Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, directed by Pro-
fessor Robert Simpson, is one of the few academic organization in the United States with a continuous
research program in Air Traffic Control problems. The Laboratory has a record of continuous research
in this field starting from its creation in the late 1960's, with some 100 reports and technical memoranda
on the subject to its credit. Among the past achievements of the Laboratory in this field we can count
the early development of CTDI (Cockpit Display of Traffic Information), the Simpson-Sheridan method
of determining crew and controller workload, various models for landside and airside airport capacity,
collision risk models, radar tracking algorithms, runway scheduling algorithms, and the real-time Air
Traffic Control simulation for the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility at NASA's Ames Research
Center. In addition, we have performed research in the closely related field of Command and Control
systems, where very large networks of men and machines combine to communicate information, take
decisions, and transmit orders. In this field, we have designed a microcomputer-based, field deployable
Command and Control system for the U.S. Air Force's Military Airlift Command, to assist them in the
real time scheduling and control of their flights, as well as equivalent systems for civilian airlines.
In the course of our research we have observed with concern that advanced concepts in Air Traffic Control
automation - whether developed at the Flight Transportation Laboratory or elsewhere - seldom reach
the floor of the Air Traffic Control Centers. A few years ago, for example, an Advanced Enroute
Metering and Spacing concept was developed, and actual code was implemented in the NAS system to
support it; to our knowledge, this capability is not used in any significant degree in any of the U.S. Air
Traffic Control Facilities.
There are critics of the proposed new Advanced Automation System, or AAS, who claim that the
algorithms required by that system will never work properly in conjunction with human controllers.
While we do not share such negative attitude towards the AAS concept, I must report that we, too,
have experienced significant problems in trying to marry a mathematical control algorithm - no matter
how advanced and well designed - with a human decision maker. As long as the algorithm's function is
*invisible" to the user - such as, for example, a radar tracking algorithm - he does not experience great
difficulties working with it. However, when the algorithm interacts directly with the human decision-
making process - such as in the detection or resolution of traffic conflicts - we often observe a conflict
between the mode of operation of an otherwise excellent algorithm and the mode of operation of the
human controller. In extreme cases, test subjects even perceive the automation feature as a hindrance
rather than as an aid.
It is precisely because of this problem with the "algorithmic approach' that we have turned to the field
of Artificial Intelligence for tools and alternative approaches to the problem of providing the users of
Air Traffic Control automation (and here I include the pilot and the flow coordinators as well as the
obvious radar controller) with functions that indeed make their job easier, not more difficult. Today, I
would like to share some of these experiences, both positive and negative, with you.
It seems only natural to begin this exposition with a brief overview of what Artificial Intelligence is,
and what are some of the generic tools it provides; however, I must warn you beforehand that I am very
prejudiced on the subject of Artificial Intelligence. We at FTL are not experts in Artificial Intelligence; we
are fortunate enough to have available to us the considerable resources of M.I.T.'s Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory and the'Laboratory for Computer Sciences, two of the leading research organizations in this
field, but I want to emphasize that we are users, and not developers, of Artificial Intelligence technology.
This leads us to a rather biased and result-oriented viewpoint on Artificial Intelligence; for us, A. I. is
not a new business, it is just a new way of doing our old business. Therefore, those of you that may
have not been exposed beforehand to A. I. should be warned that this will be a rather unorthodox
introduction to the field; on the other hand, those of you who may be familiar with A. I. may find this
user's viewpoint a refreshing experience, especially if you have been recently subjected to some of the
"high pressure" sales pitches that some promoters of Artificial Intelligence seem to be using these days.
2. A BIASED INTRODUCTION TO A. I.
Edward Feigenbaum, in his "Handbook of Artificial Intelligence", defines Artificial Intelligence, or "A. I."
for short, as "the part of computer science concerned with designing intelligent computer systems". This
is a very easy definition to make, since it shifts the burden of definition to another one, namely that of
"intelligent computer system". Feigenbaum then proceeds to define intelligent computer systems as those
which "exhibit the characteristics we associate with intelligence in human behavior". Unfortunately,
this one is not very helpful either, since we now must define intelligence itself, a rather formidable task.
But even if were able to define human intelligence, we would still have a problem, since "intelligent
behavior', when applied to computers, cannot be equated with intelligent behavior in general. As little
as a hundred years ago, computing the square root of a number was unequivocally a manifestation
of human intelligence, since it required a number of decision-making steps depending on the signs of
intermediate values, remainders, and so on. Yet to-day, nobody would call the square-root calculating
ability of a computer "intelligent behavior".
In view of this inability to satisfactorily define "intelligent behavior' as applied to a computer, some
people have slightly altered the classical definition to mean "doing with a computer something you
normally don't expect a computer to be able to do'. This definition appears to be satisfactory, since
taking square roots, for example, is something you expect a computer to do, so a system that takes
square roots of numbers is definitely not an Artificial Intelligence system, while a system that composes
concert music does appear 'intelligent", since computers do not usually compose concert music.
The problem with this new definition is that it is self-defeating: the moment one builds a computer
system that does something you do not expect a computer to do, it does it, so it ceases to become
an "Artificial Intelligence' system. As paradoxical as this may seem, it actually makes some sense:
today, one can purchase battery-powered toys at a department store that do a better job at synthesizing
speech or playing chess than the most sophisticated experimental equipment did just ten years ago. Are
these toys Intelligent Systems? How about the first FORTRAN compiler? Was it an A. I. product?
It certainly did something that previously was thought required human intervention, namely write a
computer program from complex mathematical expressions.
In view of this difficulty in defining what precisely Artificial Intelligence is, perhaps we should simply
describe a little of its history and some of its typical products. A. I. research has traditionally had three
distinct objectives: first, to understand the high-level workings of the human brain by constructing
functional computer models of human activities, such as vision and reasoning; second, to build computers
based on the brain model; and third, to build a 'mechanical man", perhaps by combining the results of
the other two efforts.
The motivation of the first line of research is a better understanding of the human brain, and any
computer functionality that may result from this research is purely secondary. The motivation of the
second, to build computer systems - both hardware and software - patterned after the human brain,
with the goal of building better computer systems, independently of the specific application.
Now, the third goal is the most elusive one; humans had had the dream of building mechanical replicas
of themselves for at least as long as they have dreamed to fly; if we have been able to fulfill the dream
of flying, is there any reason we will not be able to build a true robot? Perhaps, but we should be very
careful not to identify Artificial Intelligence with only this goal. If we do, we will miss what perhaps is
the most useful benefits from A. I. research, benefits that, in my opinion, we can begin to enjoy to-day.
However, these benefits are not the "intelligent machines" per se, but rather the computer technology
that has been developed as a consequence of the quest for machine intelligence, however one may care
to define it. I guess I should also add that A. I. is also not only Expert Systems; the current popularity
and press coverage that Expert Systems have recently received has caused a lot of people to believe that
the only useful product of Artificial Intelligence research consists of Expert Systems.
Historically, Artificial Intelligence had its roots in the discipline of mathematical logic, sometimes also
called symbolic logic, the study of the processes by means of which we construct the mental models
we call 'mathematics'. It was with the discovery, by Turing and others, that these symbols could be
manipulated and operated upon mechanically with the same ease as numbers - although with a different
set of operations, naturally - that the possibility of a computer performing these "intelligent" functions
was first postulated. Indeed, Lisp, now considered to be the programming lingua franca of the A. I.
community, can be considered either a programming language, or a convenient, elegant, and powerful
method of expressing mathematical concepts.
The first attempts at using computers to manipulate symbols for a purpose started by defining a simple
"problem" to be solved, for example, winning a game of chess. The kinds of problems that early A. I.
systems were capable of handling had two common characteristics: the goal, or problem, was very
simple to state (such as capturing the opponents' King), but the solution to the problem was complex
and non-trivial. The measure of success used in the developments of these game-playing systems was
this: could the program play a better game than the people that build it?
The common technique used in these systems was the generation of large sets of alternatives, followed
by a process of search (for a desired solution), usually coupled with procedures that reduce the number
of alternatives to be evaluated to a reasonable subset. In a chess-playing1 program, the alternatives are
the sequence of legal moves and counter-moves that can be made by the program and its opponent from
the current state of the board, alternatives that can be structured as a tree; the search consists in the
successive evaluation of each branch of the tree to find the most convenient immediate move, evaluation
that may include not only the eventual end state of the board at the ends of that branch of the trees,
but the likelihood of each of the opponent's moves.
Before these solutions can be generated, searched, reduced and evaluated, some symbols and operations
must be defined; in other words, a representation of the problem must be designed. For example, a
chess-playing system may operate on descriptions of the state of the chess board, that is, the position
of each of the pieces; the operations that can be performed on these descriptions would include valid
piece movements, or functions that measure the desirability of having a piece in a certain position
relative to other pieces. Other symbols that may be involved could include standard moves, such as the
classical chess opening moves, in such a way that the system can easily recognise when the opponent has
performed such a move, and know what the consequences of that move are without elaborate analysis.
In spite of the spectacular performance that such systems exhibit - few human chess players can out-
perform the best chess playing programs today - these efforts were in a way disappointing because of
the extreme narrow focus of the results. While some of the searching and problem reduction techniques
developed as a consequence of that research are applicable to a large class of problems, the problem
representation aspects were extremely case-dependent: the symbols and operations developed to solve
chess moves are of little or no value outside that specific problem domain.
This frustration let, in the late sixties and early seventies, to a fury of efforts to find more universal
problem representations; ideas such as "problem solving" systems and "logic reasoning" systems seemed
attainable at the time. At one time work actually began on a "General Purpose Problem Solver" system,
with no clear limitations on what kind of problems it could solve. When it became apparent that
finding truly domain-independent means of representing problems was a little too difficult, researchers
then directed their efforts to more restricted, but still relatively generic problems, for example proving
mathematical theorems or automatic computer programming.
Also at this time, and perhaps influenced by the success of the early game-playing programs, some
individuals began to make exaggerated claims about the practical possibilities of A. I. systems. Actually,
this had already happened before, even before the term "Artificial Intelligence" had been coined. Grossly
unrealistic estimates of the potential of computers to perform "intelligent" functions - whatever those
may be - were common during the early days of electronic computers, as exemplified in the contemporary
label "electronic brain".
While it helped sell some of the early work in computers, it became apparent to many that such
overselling would, in the long run, be detrimental to the growing computer industry. As a matter of
fact, IBM, the commercial leader in the field, established a rigorous internal and external program to
dispel the "electronic brain' concept from their own employees and from their customers, an effort that
culminated with the coining of the word "ordinateur" for use in French-speaking IBM markets. My
reason for bringing to light this incident is that I believe that we are today witnessing a repeat of the
same phenomenon: some recent successes, particularly the development of A. I.-oriented hardware, and
IThe circled numbers in the right-hand margin reference the viewgraphs that were used in the presentation, which can
be found at the end of the text.
the commercialization of some A. I. products, have led to a new round of overselling which we must avoid
very carefully: while A. I. technology is promising, it is certainly not the solution to all our problems.
But back to our history: While attempts to build generic problem solving system were invariably
unsuccessful, researchers discovered in the early seventies that once a problem was represented by means
of computer-manipulable symbols, it was an easy task to store individual ad-hoc knowledge about that
problem, much in the safie way as standard moves could be memorized in a chess-playing program.
And, while standard moves are but a small portion of the knowledge required to play a good game of
chess, there are other areas where it constitutes most, if not all, of the knowledge.
Consider, for example, the problem of integrating mathematical expressions; once a student learns the
basic concept of what an integral is, the problem is really reduced to learning a very large number of
"standard' integrals, such as cos(x) being the integral of sin(x), and being able to recognize patterns in
the problem that match one of the known standard integrals. Well, once the symbols and operations
required to store and manipulate mathematical functions in the computer is developed, one can store
hundreds, even thousands of standard integrals and integration techniques. In the most famous and
successful system of this kind, M.I.T.'s MACSYMA program, scores of computer scientists, logicians,
and mathematicians have contributed an enormous number of rules describing not only how to integrate,
but also how to perform a wide range of mathematical operations.
Let me show you a typical use of MACSYMA. This slide was produced directly from my terminal screen
in our A. I. computer complex. Lines with numbers beginning with the letter C are my inputs, while
lines identified with the letter D are the outputs from MACSYMA. I begin this example by typing in an
equation in a form which looks very much like FORTRAN. Notice, however, that MACSYMA displays
my input back in a form that resembles the way one would write this equation on a blackboard; this
is possible because the representation of that equation used in MACSYMA has concepts such as power
and denominator.
I then ask MACSYMA to "solve" for the variable Y in that equation; what happens next is that
MACSYMA recognizes a binomial equation pattern in that expression, and invokes the rules to solve
such equations that we all learned in High School. If, on the other hand, we ask MACSYMA to
integrate the right-hand side of that equation, it will recognize a polynomial pattern, and invoke the
classical polynomial integration rules. While I could do that myself, I would be hard pressed to integrate
the expression shown in the next slide, which involves knowing some rather exotic rules of integration. 3
I use MACSYMA frequently in my work, especially to manipulate rotation matrices that transform, for
example, position vectors in radar site coordinates to mosaic-relative coordinates. This kind of system
which is composed of an internal representation of a domain, a set of rules representing knowledge in
that domain, and a set of commands that allow the user to invoke the appropriate rule without knowing
the details of that rule is called a "knowldege-based system", or, more precisely, a "stored-knowledge"
system: the computer program has the knowledge, but does not know when and how to apply it unless
specifically instructed by the user.
The indisputable success of these "stored-knowledge' systems, coupled with the failure of totally generic
'problem-solving' or 'thinking" programs, resulted in the "Expert System" concept. Like the stored
knowledge system, an "Expert System' operates with symbols and operations representing knowledge
in a particular field, and sets of pre-stored "rules" which embody knowledge, just like the integration
rules in MACSYMA. The Expert System, however, has two additional ingredients: first, the capability
of chaining the given rules, perhaps with the help of 'intermediate results", to reach conclusions that
are not covered by any single rule; and, second, logic to direct both the invocation of the rules and the
chaining of simple rules to achieve a specific objective.
Perhaps the best way to understand the notion of 'Expert System" is to observe one in operation; in
the next few slides, I will show you a typical conversation with perhaps the most famous, or successful,
of all expert systems: the MYCIN bacterial infection diagnostic program. In the MYCIN system, a
moderately large set of rules (about a hundred) are used to store knowledge about bacterial infections.
But whereas in MACSYMA the rules were scanned to see if one of them satisfied the request typed by
the user (e.g., integrate a given expression), MYCIN rules are automatically activated in a complex way
by a logic in the program called the 'inference engine', whose built-in goal is fixed: to determine the
best antibiotic treatment for a patient whose infection is not precisely known.
To understand why MYCIN behaves the way it does, indeed to understand the importance of the
development of MYCIN, we have to review briefly what kind of problem it is solving. There are
thousands of bacteria that can cause infections in humans, and hundreds of available antibiotic drugs
that act specifically on a bacteria, or groups of bacteria, while having more or less desirable side effects.
If the identity of the bacteria causing a patient's infection were to be known, a very precise antibiotic
treatment could be prescribed. Unfortunately, full identification of a bacteria from a culture requires
from a few days to a few weeks, while antibiotic treatment must begin immediately. Thus, treatment is
begun with only sketchy data on what kind of bacteria is involved - usually a two to three hour culture
yielding only very basic information about the bacteria, not its precise identity.
The way MYCIN achieves this objective is by assuming a very large number of possible alternatives, and
then asking the user to provide information that it can use to eliminate as many alternatives as possible,
until all the information is exhausted. This technique is known as backwards-chaining the rules.
The conversation shown in these slides is a little long, but I hope you will find it interesting; MYCIN's K
questions are preceded by a number, while the user's answers are preceded by three asterisks. After
the usual basic questions about the patient, MYCIN, checks in question (4) that the basic operating
premise, that is, the existence of an infection, is indeed true (I guess that if one were to answer no to
that question MYCIN would simply say Oh, well, goodbye, then).
At the very beginning of the conversation, MACSYMA printed the label PATIENT-1; after question (4),
it prints the label INFECTION-1; these labels are an indication of the context of the conversation. When
we humans exchange information verbally, we implicitly establish a context in which indefinite articles
such as"it" or "he" ' have a unique meaning. Although MYCIN does not understand English, it always
has a current context, or implicit object of inquiry which begins with the patient, switches to the first
infection (for that patient), and then may change to an organism, to a culture, change back to the
patient, and so on.
After establishing that the type of infection is known, so that a series of questions leading to the
identification of the type or possible types of infection is not necessary, MYCIN then proceeds to
find out what laboratory information has been obtained on the organism or organisms producing the
infection. Answers to a question, including the answer "don't know", dynamically modify the sequence of 6
successive questions. Note also that the user's answers can be followed by a number in parenthesis, such
as in question 13; this indicates the degree of confidence that the user has in that piece of information,
with 1 indicating absolute certainty, and 0 being equivalent to a don't know answer.
After about forty or so questions, MYCIN is ready to display a conclusion; perhaps it is satisfied that
this conclusion has a low enough uncertainty factor, or, more likely, the user has begun to answer "I
don't know* to so many questions that MYCIN decided that to give up asking. In any case, MYCIN
displays, first, its conclusions regarding the possible identity of the organism causing the infection. As
you can see, it is not a single conclusion, but rather six. Next, after three additional questions, MYCIN
proceeds to issue a "preferred treatment", preferred in that there may be other treatments covering
the same set of bacterial infections, and which may be preferable to the user for reasons that MYCIN
cannot handle (for example, local availability).
The next slide shows the form of a typical MYCIN rule; on the top of the slide is the text of the
50th rule, as stored in MYCIN, while a comment in English, at the bottom of the slide, explains the
meaning of the rule (for the benefit of us humans). The rule has two parts: a premise and a conclusion.
If the premise is true, then the conclusion is true, much like an if - then statement in a traditional
programming language such as FORTRAN. A program using this kind of rules is sometimes called a
production system.
The premise is in itself composed of the boolean, or logical, combination of three clauses; each clause
in itself consists of a predicate - a statement that may or may not be true - relating an attribute of an
object to a value. For example, in the second clause of rule 50's premise, MEMBF (meaning "a member
of") is the predicate, CNTXT is the object - actually, this stands for "the current context, whatever it may
be' - SITE is the attribute, and STERILSITES is the value with respect to which that object's attribute
must satisfy the predicate. This clause would be true if the value of the SITE attribute of the current
context is a member of STERILSITES (presumably a list of values).
The action part of Rule 50 consists simply of the identifier CONCLUDE followed by a statement of value
of an object's attribute, possibly followed by a certainty index: here, the rule affirms that the IDENT
attribute of the context is BACTEROIDES with a certainty of 0.7. Note that this fact could have been
established by the user if he had answered positively question number 9, which asked "Enter the identity
of organism-1'. MYCIN rules are triggered by values of attributes, and these values can be established
either by user's answers or by rules' conclusions. Indeed, MYCIN's backwards chaining logic determines
which questions to ask the user by determining which rules, if triggered, would restrict the potential
conclusions the most.
I find a demonstration of MYCIN an impressive experience, but perhaps this is due to the impressive
medical terms used, rather than the computer's operation. My medical friends tell me that it impresses
them too, but then I suspect that perhaps it is the computer that impresses them. Nevertheless, I am
convinced that Expert System technology can be of considerable value, but only if applied to a problem
for which an Expert System is honestly the best tool to use.
3. ATC APPLICATIONS OF A. I. TECHNOLOGY
This overview of the world of Artificial Intelligence has been, by necessity, very brief. It has not covered,
for instance, any of the work done in natural language processing, that is, the analysis of human language
- written or oral - to extract specific information; I have not covered speech synthesis and recognition
- a different problem than that of understanding natural language; I have not covered robotics, the
discipline that deals with mechanical manipulators and touch sensors; finally, I will only mention vision
and image recognition, even though I believe there may be an opportunity for ATC applications of
artificial vision.
After having explained what A. I. is, it seems that in order to make justice to the title of this talk we
should also briefly mention what we mean by ATC. By Air Traffic Control we do not mean exclusively
the activity of the man or women behind the radar screen issuing vectors and clearances to aircraft and
looking out for conflicts; we very specifically include all the activity that, combined, makes for a safe
and efficient ATC system, such as planning the command and control structure of the system - that is,
determining when and where information is transmitted, and when and where decisions are made - or
selecting the set of airways that will constitute the preferential routes from two busy terminal areas in
a particular complex weather situation. As you will see, the possibilities for useful applications of A. I.
technology to the world of ATC go well beyond the radar controller's screen.
Some of the technologies of Artificial Intelligence can be of quite immediate application; others may
have to wait five, ten, or even twenty years before they can be seriously considered. I will try to be
as broad and comprehensive as I can, so I will mention both short-term and long-term applications. I
would like. however, to divide these immediate and future applications in a different way, namely two
groups which I call "visible' and 'invisible'.
Invisible applications are those where the A. I. component is hidden from the final user of the ATC
product or system. Perhaps A. I. technology was used in the design, development or implementation of
the system for economic reasons, or perhaps it is the only way in which to mechanize a certain function,
but as far as the user is concerned, it is just another computer program.
In a visible application, on the other hand, the particular behavior of an A. I. product - as typified in the
MYCIN example - is an essential part of the usefulness of the tool, and the user must be prepared and
trained to use it in this way. In the invisible category I would like to mention symbolic programming,
experimental simulation, radar tracking algorithms, and procedure generation. In the visible category
I would like to propose a theoretical flow oriented command and control structure, an expert system
to help select runway configurations, two very similar applications of visual scene recognition, and the
&controller's assistant' concept.
"What?" you will say: 'he is not going to talk about applications of voice recognition?". Well, I am
sorry to disappoint you, but I am not. About the only application I can foresee for this technology is the
simulation of pilots' voices - and ears -in a real time Air Traffic Control simulation, and I am afraid that
the available technology is not capable of doing even this. At the present time, voice recognition and
synthesis seems to be more of a solution looking for a problem, that a solution to an existing problem.
Actually, I would be delighted to be proven wrong so I can have an excuse to buy a new voice recognition
system for my lab.
4. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF COM-
PLEXITY
The history of aeronautical technology has always characterized by "barriers", or measures of perfor-
mance that were considered unattainable: transoceanic flight, stratospheric flight, blind flying, the sound
barrier, the heat bairrier, space. One by one these "barriers" have been conquered. I believe that the
current barrier, the one performance limit we must conquer today, is the "complexity" barrier. Consider
this: Charles Lindberg's aircraft, the Spirit of St. Louis, required 850 man-hours of engineering effort
to design; the Lockheed C5A Galaxy transport jet took 49 million man-hours to design. As aircraft
become more complex, and as the relationships between aerodynamics, propulsion, avionics, and even
radar signature become more and more interrelated in determining the performance of the aircraft, this
complexity, and the cost of designing it, will become greater and greater.
Nowhere is this more dramatic than in present and future Air Traffic Control systems. The U.S. ATC
system has already been dubbed "the most complex man-machine system in the world"; indeed, its
complexity has reached a point where nobody quite knows how the entire system operates, and it is
becoming more and more difficult to estimate what effect on the entire system the introduction of a new
component, such as direct routings, will have. Even something as simple and as localized as the minimum
safe runway lateral separation for simultaneous instrument approaches requires a tremendous amount
of engineering and analysis to determine, since it involves the interaction between radar performance,
flight procedures, aircraft dynamics, and aircrew performance.
Is there a limit to this complexity? Will we reach a maximum complexity in aircraft and ATC systems
beyond which it will be impossible for us to determine if the system will work properly?
Another area where the cost of this complexity in quite evident is computer software; it is a well
established fact that the cost of developing a software system is not proportional to the size of the
system: "two programmers can do in nine months what any of them could do in twelve months" is
the popular proverb. A more detailed analysis of the additional costs incurred when a large software
project is partitioned in N smaller components is N to the one and one-half power, and this, coupled
with the decreasing cost of computer hardware, has resulted in a reversal of the relative importance of
hardware and software costs: whereas fifteen years ago, hardware costs for a large system were typically
then times larger than software costs, today it is software which is about ten times more expensive than
hardware for a typical command and control system.
Artificial Intelligence researchers discovered the software complexity barrier very early, and, with the
freedom possible in the academic and research environment developed a number of tools and techniques
to manage this complexity far more effective than those developed by the industrial community, subject
to the demands of daily business. While the latter tried to manage software complexity by building
more complex tools, therefore adding to complexity - I am referring here to the Ada language and all
the tools that have been developed around it - the universities and research laboratories have developed
Lisp machines and Icon-based interfaces: they attack complexity by developing simpler tools, not more
complex ones.
The differences in programming productivity are tremendous: while the industry standard for fully
developed, tested and documented code ranges between 1200 and 2000 lines of code per man-year,
project-wide averages of 20000 to 50000 lines are not uncommon in Artificial Intelligence projects. In
addition to the simple increase in single-programmer productivity, this difference is compounded by the
reduction in the number of individual pieces in which a large project must be subdivided in order to
meet the required schedule (the 'n to the one-and-a half power" law), with overall differences in software
cost of up to 100 to 1, for the same resulting software functionality.
The reason for this difference is actually quite simple: programming is nothing more than the translation
of the original functional specifications of the system to be designed into the simpler elements that can
be executed ,in a computer; in the early days, these were individual bits, representing either data or
instructions, so that the entire translation process had to be performed by the human programmer.
Next came the 'assembler" or "machine languages" which, while operating with the same machine-
level elements, at least allowed the programmer to refer to them by names and symbols, rather than by
anonymous numbers. The advent of the so-called "high-order languages" raised the interface to the level
of vectors, arrays, strings and passive data structures, and produced what appeared to be a miraculous
increase in programming productivity.
High-order languages, even in their most complex form such as Ada, are still rooted in the Von Neumann
concept -of the computer as a sequential executor of instructions. Code and data, for example, are two
distinct and unmixable elements, linkable only through the process of compilation. By comparison,
symbolic computation removes itself one step further from the details of hardware, and allows truly
abstract concepts to be represented and manipulated on a computer. Probably the most spectacular
consequence of this increased level of abstraction is that the program itself, or "code" becomes simply
one more abstraction, and thus can be directly manipulated by a program without the compilation or
interpretation barrier of high-order languages.
And this is only the beginning; A. I. research is fast advancing in the direction of "declarative pro-
gramming", languages - or, rather, programming models - that allow the user to state the functional
specification for a computer system in extremely abstract terms without having to specify, for instance,
the sequence in which operations have to be performed to arrive at the desired effect. These languages,
while still many years away, may make Lisp look as mechanical and complex as high-order languages
look in comparison to Lisp.
It is interesting to observe that while the attempts to build an 'automatic programming system" during
the early seventies were dismal failures, the same results are begin arrived at by a diametrically opposite
route: instead of a very-high level program that transforms any program specification to the detailed
instructions that computer hardware requires, we are seeing computer hardware and software that
operate at higher and higher levels of abstraction: a "bottom-up" approach, rather than the "top-
down" approach of the automatic programming concept.
Of course, nothing comes free; this increase in the level of abstraction at which the machine interfaces
with the human programmer entails an inevitable increase in the processing power required in hardware.
But one should not look at this increase as "inefficiency" or "overhead"; in fact, this additional processing
is performing an extremely useful function, namely the translation process from abstraction to machine
bits and back, of both code and data. Therefore, will have to learn to accept much higher computer
processing requirements as a natural by-product of our increase in complexity; but do not worry: the
continuing decline in the cost of processing, or, if you wish, the increasing performance of computer
hardware will make it more palatable. The important point to consider is that the computer technology
- both hardware and software - used today by Artificial Intelligence researchers may become the only
economical way of implementing very complex software systems in the near future.
5. RESEARCH SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY
Leaving behind the world of computer software, we find that some of the same problems that plague
builders of large software systems also haunt designers of large HUMAN systems; even if the Air Traffic
Control system used no computers at all, the flow of information, and the distribution of decision-making
authority makes the system look very much like a gigantic computer, with procedures, rules, regulations,
and letters of agreement being its 'program".
We have long passed the stage where the effects of major changes in procedures or technology can be
evaluated effectively by simple analysis: simulation becomes the ultimate evaluation and verification
tool. Unfortunately, building and running a sufficiently good simulation of a very complex system can
extremely costly.
Consider the differences between an aircraft simulator and, for example, the simulation of an advanced
ATC controller station of the year 2000. While the basic principles of aerodynamics, structures, propul-
sion and so on cannot change radically from now to the year 2000, the same cannot be said - at least
in principle - of Air Traffic procedures: there are few physical limitations to what can be displayed on
a futuristic controller's screen. So whereas the aircraft simulation can count on a number of essential
fixed elements no matter what the configuration of the experiment may be, the same cannot be said of
an Air Traffic Control systems simulation.
One of the "secondary skills' that the Flight Transportation Laboratory has had to acquire as a requisite
to perform high-quality research in Air Traffic Control is the design, building and running of large scale
simulations of the Air Traffic Control environment. We are now beginning the design of our fifth
ATC simulator, which will use what we consider is the "third generation' of simulation technology,
a technology based on a combination of symbolic computation and object-oriented programming, a
technology which, although now part of the standard vocabulary of modern computer science, was
developed, and is heavily used by, the Artificial Intelligence community.
The traditional way of designing, implementing, and using large system simulators was this: a detailed
specification was drawn of the "fixed" part of the system, that is, the part that is not expected to
change from one experiment to another. Next, the user defined some bounds on the kind of experiments
that would be run on the simulator. The simulator designer then would convert the fixed part of the
specification to detailed formulations of the "core' of the sim, which would include generation of large
amounts of data that could be used to feed the expected experiments. Also, the behavior of the core
system would be determined, as much as possible, by parameters that could be read from a data file a
simulation initialization time, so that the core could be tailored as much as possible to the particular
experiment that is to be run.
To put all these words in perspective, let us consider a "typical" Air Traffic Control research simulation.
The core would probably consist of models of the dynamics of the aircraft - popularly known as "targets",
since most classical ATC seems were developed from radar simulators; also included in the core would be
simple radar models, a simple controller display screen, tools to measure "performance" of the system
(for example aircraft minimum separation), and the tools to allow the experimenter to control the
experiment: start and stop the aim, create and destroy targets, induce faults, etc.
Now the trouble begins: what should we include in the aircraft models? Well, since a future ATC
system is likely to use the Discrete Address Beacon System - now called "Mode S" - as opposed to
the traditional Mode C transponder, we should probably include it in the aircraft model, as well as on
the radar model, since it may have back-to-back antennas to double the interrogation rate. How about
direct, off-route navigation capability? Microwave Landing System? Digital downlink? Now, certain
experiments are likely to involve weather avoidance; should we build models for weather patterns, or at
least the presence of weather data on the controller's screen? The list can go on indefinitely.
Suppose we have the resources to program most of the features that we expect could be required on
most experiments. Certainly not all experiments are going to require all of these features. But never
mind, we can enable or disable any of these models by means of flags in the initialization file, so only
those components that are actually required in an experiment will run.
But now, suppose somebody wishes to run an experiment to determine the best way in which Central
Flow Control should interface with the Traffic Management Unit at a Center! Well, now we are out
of luck, because we certainly cannot afford to simulate hundreds of aircraft - and we need that many
to simulate the actions of flow control - at that level of detail. Indeed, we probably do not want to
simulate flow control operations in real time, but faster than real time. Oh well, you can say, that is
not fair! We have the wrong level of detail simulator to analyze flow control problems! That, of course,
is absolutely correct: you need a different simulator to analyze that problem, one where the position of
each individual aircraft is not important, but only the number of aircraft entering and departing each
sector.
But let us assume that we have a problem that does require the real-time simulation of the position
of each individual aircraft; let us assume that we wish to evaluate the benefits to the controller of a
conflict alerting algorithm. Certainly that algorithm was not included in the detailed specifications of
the core system around which the simulator was build, so it will have to be coded specifically for this
experiment. Where will the data required by this algorithm come from? Most likely from specific slots
in some FORTRAN common block. This means that this detailed implementation data will have to
be carefully documented and controlled; it also means that for each experimenter, for each algorithm
designer, there will have to be an army of programmers dedicated to interfacing the new algorithm with
the simulator. Even if the cost of this programming were acceptable, the time required to prepare an
experiment would run in the weeks, if not in the months.
The alternative to this traditional approach is to build not a "core" simulator, and an array of ad-
hoc extensions for each new experiment to be run, but rather a "kit" of building blocks with which a
customized simulation can be built in a very short period of time. In other words, we not only accept,
but actually encourage the notion that a new simulation will have to be built for each new experiment
in Air Traffic Control technology.
The key to this approach is the level of abstraction of these building blocks. Using symbolic programming
techniques, it is possible to build blocks such as 'VOR", "Aircraft', "Random Aircraft Generation Point"
"Airport Runway', "Airway Intersection", "Radar", 'Display Screen", and the like. Moreover, there
can be many different types of these blocks, not only in terms of their performance parameters - you
can do this in FORTRAN with initialization files - but even in the level of detail being simulated.
For example, the Flight Transportation Laboratory is currently designing a "building block kit" which
will allow the experimenter to intermix three very different levels of simulation at the same time: a Level
I, where the smallest geographic unit represented is a control area, say several sectors large, and aircraft
dynamics consist only in movements from an area to an adjacent area. At this level of detail, the entire
continental U.S. could be modeled, with some 2000 aircraft, with very little effort required to set up the
experiment. A Level II would look into the actual geometry of the airway structure, as well as direct
routings, and be able to model individual sectors. At this level of detail, the position of each individual
aircraft along an airway or along its direct route would be modeled, but not, for example, the effects of
individual radar vectoring. The maximum number of sectors that one would like to model this way is
probably ten or fifteen, with a total of one to two hundred aircraft, enough to analyze problems relating
to the communications and handoffs between two centers. Finally, Level III of simulation detail would
look at individual aircraft dynamics and the performance of radar sensors, and would be the level of
detail at which to look at problems such as simultaneous instrument arrivals to closely-spaced parallel
runways, or the sector-to-sector interactions for a maximum of, say, three sectors and thirty or forty
aircraft.
This "building block kit' would then include not only three levels of airspace models and three levels of
aircraft models, but also different display formats for each level. The important feature of this approach
is the possibility, if designed correctly, to run a simulation where the entire country is modeled with
Level I elements, except for two centers, which are modeled with Level II elements, and have within
these two centers two or three sectors modeled with Level III elements!
Object-oriented and symbolic technology are capable of solving the problem of interfacing these rather
dissimilar objects together. Consider a flow control algorithm that wants to know how many aircraft
are in a certain area, the smallest Level I unit of airspace. In traditional programming, the programmer
would have to know the location of that number in whatever data structure contains that information
for a Level I area, but would probably have to write a subroutine to obtain that information from a Level
II center, since it would have to add all the aircraft in each of that center's sectors. With object-oriented
programming, the burden of providing any information about an object is shifted from the seeker of the
information to the supplier of the information.
The technique in question is called "message passing"; each object in the "kit' is known to respond to
a certain number of requests, or "messages". These requests can either ask for information about the
object, or ask that the object perform some action that has a "side effect", such as displaying a symbol
on a screen. All the interactions between objects must be through these "publicly advertised" messages.
Part of the effort required in designing such a simulation is to define what kinds of messages should
each object be required to handle.
Once this is decided, though, the task of inter-object communication is enormously reduced; if both
Level I areas and Level II centers are required to reply to the message "how many aircraft do you have
now", it does not matter to the object requesting the data whether this data is obtained by simply
looking it up somewhere, or by laborious computation: it simply is returned in response to the message.
If the internal makeup of an object must be modified - say, in response to the requirements of a new
experiment - only its way of handling its incoming messages must be modified, whereas in the traditional
technology every object that could possibly interact with the modified object would have to be modified
as a consequence of this change.
The development of this simulation architecture is, in my own opinion, the most exciting ATC-related
project at the Flight Transportation Laboratory in the last decade. If successful - and there are a
number of major technological obstacles still to overcome - it may enable for the first time the testing
and evaluation of truly advanced ATC concepts in a sufficiently realistic environment, at reasonable
cost.
The concept of building a real-time ATC simulation 'on the fly' based on software building blocks
as I just described has been demonstrated at the Flight Transportation Laboratory, where a full scale
Level III simulator using this technique is in daily use. The largest technology risk associated with this
simulation is related to its hardware; in addition to the building-block software approach described, it is
designed around a building-block hardware architecture; the same message-based interaction technique
that allows different kinds of objects to interface in a homogeneous manner will also allow these objects
- and the functionality they carry - to reside in different processors, with some limitations, so that
the exact number of processors available to run the simulation is invisible to the software, although, of
course, the resulting performance will be very visible to the user.
This will also allow incremental growth in the capabilities of the simulator, as more processors and
display hardware are added without the need for software re-coding, but is dependent on very recent,
and still untried advances in symbolic computation hardware.
6. AN EXPERT SYSTEM FOR RUNWAY CONFIGURATION MANAGE-
MENT
Curiously, there are fewer opportunities for "classical" expert systems such as MYCIN in Air Traffic
Control than one might expect. Indeed, there a few circumstances where accumulated knowledge, as
opposed to skill or ability, determine the performance of a control function.
Perhaps one of the most promising short-term applications of classical expert systems may be to the
problem of runway configuration management, that is, the selection of a what runway configuration to
use under changing weather and flow conditions. Complex airports, such as Chicago, or the New York
City Metroplex, have hundreds of possible runway and approach configurations. The problem consists
in selecting which configuration to use, and, more particularly, selecting when to perform a configuration
change: the relative timing of the arrival of a front at the airport terminal area with respect to the peak
traffic hour may make a difference as to whether the runway configuration change should be performed
in advance, or delayed with respect to the weather-optimum time. Moreover, weather at other airports
may affect the normal traffic pattern at an airport so that, for example, a snow storm approaching the
Boston area from a westerly direction requires a different runway configuration change strategy than one
approaching from the northwest, since the former will hit New York before Boston, therefore causing
potential diversion of traffic from the NYC area.
This simultaneous consideration of multiple contradicting factors, some of which may be the result of
many years of experience and observation at the station in question, lends itself ideally to mechanisation
as an expert system. Indeed, FTL is developing such an Expert System, under the code name "Tower
Chief". This name was selected to bring to mind the notion that the Tower Chief is usually the senior
- therefore the most experienced - controller in that facility, and therefore would be the ideal person
to make runway configuration decisions at all times, not just when he is the actual shift supervisor. By
capturing "his" expertise, the expert system would make available to any supervisor having to make
such decisions the expertise and accumulated knowledge of the senior person.
Actually, such an expert system would be capable of storing knowledge and associations furnished by
a number of individuals, and therefore be of use to the Tower Chief himself, specially in its ability to
be comprehensive in examining all the knowledge elements pertinent to the current state of affairs. On
the other hand, I dislike the name 'Tower Chief', since, in addition to the concept of wisdom and
experience, it also calls to mind the concept of authority, or responsibility. There is therefore the danger
of concluding that such an expert system, by virtue of its superior data base, is able to make superior
decisions than a human in this situation. This is clearly not so. In fact, beyond the assurance that
the expert system has systematically tested all the knowledge contained in the data base, the greatest
benefit that the shift supervisor can derive from the use of tower chief is not the final conclusion or
recommendation that it may make regarding the runway configuration changes to select, but rather its
capability to display the logical process that lead to that conclusion. This display can be used not only
to help make a final decision, but also to enrich both the expert system's and the human's knowledge
base; therefore, I would have preferred to title this project "supervisor's consultant", but it is a little
late for this, so I will continue to call it 'Tower Chief'.
Some technical problems must be resolved before rules and knowledge can begin to enter a Tower
Chief prototype system. As with all knowledge-based systems, expert or not, the work begins with
the construction of logic abstractions capable of representing, both to a computer and its user, the
elements of knowledge in the particular field; for Tower Chief, these may be "runway', 'prevalent
winds" 'primary flow direction' etc. etc. with, again, both data and functionality being associated
with these abstractions. This is the knowledge engineering phase, and is now under active development
for Tower Chief at FTL.
Simultaneously with the knowledge engineering phase, an "Expert System systems design" must be
carried out. This is the design of the process by means of which the abstractions will be entered,
searched, activated, processed, and displayed in the operation of the expert system. There are a number
of "classical' methodologies, such as "forward chaining', where as many of the rules as may possibly
be activated given the established facts are invoked, until all the rules have been used, and MYCIN's
"backwards chaining', where a number of hypothesis are postulated and tested by means of the rules,
until as many of them as possible have been weeded out. Other classical techniques address the method
of incorporating rules into the knowledge base, requesting specific data items as the hypothesis tree is
traversed to reduce the number of branches that must be explored, etc. This collection of techniques,
and the software used to implement them are referred to as 'expert system cores".
A small but growing industry of "pre-fabricated' expert system cores offers a large number of more or
less off the shelf software systems. These cores consist of a general-purpose structure for representing
knowledge, and the "inference engine' or logic that drives activation of the rules to achieve the final
objective. Along with these features, some of these systems also come equipped with fabulous claims
about the speed and ease with which useful expert systems can be built around them.
Unfortunately, these claims are usually exaggerated for two reasons: first, because experience has shown
that rule-processing procedures are much less universal than previously thought; second, because even if
an existing core is adequate to perform the rule processing required in a particular problem, a significant
knowledge engineering effort is usually required to cast the particular knowledge relevant to the problem
in the forms required by the expert system core.
Tower Chief is the second ATC-oriented prototype expert system developed at FTL. The-first - known
simply as Rule System One, or RS-1 - was only an experimental system in which conventional algorithms
could be re-implemented as rules, and was developed to gain familiarity with expert system techniques,
and not to demonstrate any useful function. RS-1 showed us, for example, that ATC problems are
particularly ill-suited for pre-fabricated expert system cores. In RS-1, data, or rather, assertions about
the objects known to the system, arrived in time-sequenced frames, corresponding to entire revolutions
of an terminal radar antenna; thus the "assertion base" - the data base of statements asserted to be true
about the objects - was continually evolved; moreover, rules may refer not only to current assertions,
but also to past assertions, or even changes in assertion, as for instance: "If aircraft-1 appears to
be on a base leg, and it was previously affirmed to be on final, something is wrong". Among the
interesting consequences of the RS-1 work, we found that the concept of 'past', as applied to computer
implementations of knowledge, is more complex than previously thought.
Symbolic computaion has tought us that the concept of 'equality' is more complex than the simple
'equality of numerical values' of FORTRAN; for example, a simple chair and an armchair are clearly not
'equal" , while two identical armchairs are, to a certain degree, 'equal', although they two two different
chairs - two different notions of equality. Similarly, we have two different notions of "past': suppose, for
example, a rule which estimates the general direction of an aircraft track; this rule may ask the assertion
base for the previous heading of the aircraft in order to compare it with Lhe current heading. But suppose
that, during the previous four-second revolution of the antenna, insufficient valid transponder hits were
received and a missed reply was declared for that target during that antenna revolution; what should be
answered to the question "what is the previous target data?" One possibility is to answer "not known",
since there was no reply on that antenna pass; but another is to return the target data for the last
antenna pass during which there was valid data. In a way, both are "previous" data, but the answers
may be quite different.
The consequence is, of course, that there are (at least) two different "pasts", one relating to the sequence
of known data, independently of the time at which it was asserted, and another relating to a sequence
of instants of time. Such a feature was not available in "off the shelf" cores at the time the RS-1 effort
was started.
In addition to this "passage-of-time" problem, Tower Chief will also be subject to three more time
related problems: first, the elements of knowledge that Tower Chief will handle will have themselves a
time component, similar, but more complex, than the time-related questions asked by MYCIN.
Second, the goal of this expert system is really a program, or timed sequence of runway configuration
changes, so time is one of the components of the answer, as well as of the data used to arrive at the
answer; nobody has had any significant experience in designing expert system that deal with time as
one of the parameters of the goal.
Third, - and this is a problem faced by all Expert Systems whose answer is required in real time - the
search for answers may be terminated by the time available, rather than by exhaustion of the search,
as in MYCIN, where the time required to arrive at the answer is not really important, as long as it
is reasonable. There is little experience about time-constrained expert system performance; indeed,
we already know that expert systems share with some Operation Research methods the property that,
while monotonic, the rate of improvement of the answer may vary widely with tim . in some cases,
an excellent answer may be arrived at very quickly, with only marginal improvements afterwards; in
other cases, the bulk of the solution improvement may only be achieved at the very end of the search,
so that an early termination may produce a very unsatisfactory answer. We don't know at this time if
the amount of processing required by Tower Chief will be such that time-terminated processing will be
required; if it is, its performance may depend on new developments in solution search techniques which
guarantee uniform solution improvement with time. As an aside, one of the methods that have been
proposed to achieve this uniformity involves the intentional randomization of the search procedure, in
a "Monte Carlo" like process.
7. TWO SIMPLE APPLICATIONS OF MECHANICAL VISION IN ATC
An entire field of research in Artificial Intelligence is that of visual scene recognition, that is, the
processing of raw data from, say, a television camera or other means of converting visual information
into bits, with the purpose of identifying objects, positions, three-dimensional shape, and even higher-
order relationships, such as attachment between objects or their constituent materials.
At first glance there would seem to be no obvious application of this "robot vision" capability in Air
Traffic Control, unless one wished to build a robot tower controller or a robot pilot. Actually, there are
two very good possibilities, one on the ground, and one in the air.
A useful ground system based on mechanical vision and scene recognition would be a low cost, totally
passive LIDAR, or Light-based Radar. Such a system would consist of two, perhaps three Television
cameras mounted on fast remote-controlled tilting and panning heads, and equipped with fast zoom
lenses. Controlled by a computer with visual recognition software, this system could act as a "VFR
radar" in congested small general aviation airports, those airports, such as my own home base in Bedford
Massachusetts, whose traffic density changes from being higher than that of Heathrow during fine VFR
conditions, to practically nothing as the weather becomes IFR. Visually scanning for aircraft, this system
could present to the tower local controller a plan view display of the aircraft within the airport's traffic
area.
In its simplest form, this system would periodically scan the horizon surrounding the airport and create
a visual 'map" of the fixed features around the cameras: trees, buildings, hills. Some of these features
may change periodically, such as the foliage of the trees, but just as in a modern radar's clutter map,
they can be immediately recognized by their very, very slow rate of change.
Real scene recognition begins with slow, but really dynamic objects, such as clouds and birds. Clouds
have such a characteristic texture, size, and speed that it should be trivial to separate them from
aircraft targets. How can this system distinguish a bird at five hundred meters from a light airplane at
five kilometers? One possibility is radial velocity: the bird at five hundred meters can faster across the
camera's field of view than a similar-sized aircraft target.
Now, if the bird happens to be flying towards the camera, then the computer can zoom in to increase the
level of detail of that target, and real shape recognition can occur. Military research in the recognition of
surface ships by their shape has shown that this technology is capable of differentiating even the minute
differences between sister ships. It should not be very difficult for this proposed system to determine not
just the difference between a bird and an aircraft, but even the type of aircraft, its registration number,
and, by determining the attitude of the aircraft, its heading, course, altitude, and descent rate.
In addition to acquiring all this information, the system has some unusual potential for presenting the
information to the controller: for instance, instead of the usual bars we are accustomed to in high-
intensity radar displays, we could have a small picture of the actual aircraft, in color, obtained by the
system's cameras, and processed by the computer so that at any time in that aircraft's flight, that
picture should look just like what the controller should see with his binoculars were he to look for that
aircraft.
Now we have a system that not only is more sensitive than a human controller in detecting and pro-
cessing visual targets, but may even provide him with additional information about the target that a
conventional radar certainly could not. And being only software, it is a cheap system to produce in
large numbers, so as to offset its probably large software development cost.
While the hardware required to process the amount of visual information that such a system would need
is not very far in the future - say, five to ten years - here is another system that will probably have to
wait a little longer for the needed hardware capability to develop. Take the airport visual surveillance
system, and mount it on an aircraft, using wide field-of-view fixed-focus lenses and extremely high density
imaging devices. Program the scene recognition system to look out for visual targets and deduce its
trajectory with respect to the own aircraft. You have then created a visual collision avoidance system
with the same or better performance than a fully alert human crew member.
8. AN ABSTRACT CONCEPT OF FLOW CONTROL
The next concept in Air Traffic Control that I would like to present to you is not a "gadget" like Tower
Chief or the visual radar, but actually a concept. It is related to Artificial Intelligence because it is the
result of building abstract representations of knowledge, capable of being implemented on a computer;
but also independent of any computer implementation. Indeed, they could very well be implemented as
procedures, with humans performing all the information handling and decision making.
These abstractions are models of how a flow of aircraft could be regulated by control elements that
interact only with their neighbors; at what level this flow control would be carried out is immaterial:
the test prototype we have implemented in our computer at FTL operates at the tactical, terminal area
level; but the concept could equally well be implemented at the Central Flow Control level. It is far too
early to decide whether these abstractions would be of any use in a future ATC environment or not;
my purpose in presenting this work to you is only to show a different kind of *product' of Artificial
Intelligence thinking in Air Traffic Control research.
The development of these abstractions began as an attempt to state, in knowledge representation terms, 15
the classical time-based Metered Merge control problem, which can be simply stated as follows: merge
two streams of incoming aircraft with random interarrival times to form a single output stream with
uniform aircraft separation. This is usually performed by assuming an ideal 'conveyor belt" of time
slots, and by assigning aircraft from both incoming streams to a slot in the conveyor belt, and then
maneuvering the aircraft - in the time dimension, hence the name "time-based' merge - to their assigned 16
slot. This maneuvering in time may, of course, require complex maneuvering in two-dimensional space.
The picture is a little more complicated when not two, but a number of incoming streams must merge
into a single one: each route begins at one of the sources; the routes merge in pairs, until a single path
arrives at the sink, thus creating a binary converging tree.
Previously developed algorithms assumed the existence of a centralized decision-making logic with direct
and instantaneous access to all the information required to decide what maneuvers each aircraft should
be required to perform to arrive at the ultimate sink at the desired spacing. While there is nothing
theoretically wrong with this approach, and while it indeed works, from a mathematical standpoint, it
creates an operational problem:
Flow control is only one of the tasks to be performed by the ATC system. Indeed, separation assurance
is by far more important, in the short term, than orderly flow of traffic. For a number of technical,
operational, and historical reasons, responsibility for separation assurance requires that ATC functions
be divided into small sectors under the authority of a single human controller, as opposed to a central
control authority. This "federated" approach, which is optimal for separation assurance and respon-
sibility accounting, conflicts with the centralized approach of traditional flow control algorithms. In a
federated approach, each control element - that is, each controller - interacts mainly with his immediate
neighbors, rather than with a centralized arbitrator: handoffs are initiated, accepted, or rejected on a
one-to-one basis, and not as a result of the decision-making of a central authority.
For this reasons, flow control procedures are difficult to implement and interface with in a federated
ATC environment. It would be interesting to develop and test a flow control approach that operated as
a number of independent elements which interact only among neighbors, in the same way tactical ATC
elements do. This such approach, developed at MIT's Flight Transportation Laboratory, is called the
"Metered Merge Control Element3 , or MMCE, concept. Again it is too early to decide if this approach
has any merit or not, and I am presenting it here only to illustrate the kind of product that can be
developed using the A. I. approach to computers.
Conceptually, the MMCE consists of the following elements: two 'entry gates", a single "exit gate", and
two 'nominal transit times' from each of the entry gates to the exit gate. While it is useful to visualize
the MMCE as a Y-shaped merging path, the geometry of the MMCE is irrelevant to the concept, except
insomuch as the transit times are related to the size and shape of the paths.
Connected to the exit gate, each MMCE has a "downstream correspondent', which can be either another
MMCE, or, in the case of the last MMCE of the tree, the aircraft sink. Connected to each entry gate is
an 'upstream correspondent', either another MMCE's or, in the case of the first MMCE's in the tree,
the aircraft sources. Sources, MMCE's, and the sink comprise the entire Metered Merge flow control
abstraction. This abstraction is independent of the scale of the problem: it could be the Terminal
Area around an airport, with the sources being the feeder fixes, and the arrival runway; or it could be
an enroute problem, with the sources being originating airports and the sink the destination airport's
terminal area. In any case, the operation of the abstraction is as follows:
When an aircraft appears at a source, its existence is immediately made known to the MMCE imme-
diately downstream of this source. In the absence of any flow control, that aircraft would reach the
MMCE's exit gate at a time which is equal to the time at which the aircraft appeared, plus the nominal
transit time through the MMCE's right or left branch, as appropriate. Therefore, that aircraft should
appear at the entry gate of the current MMCE's downstream correspondent at that time. This infor-
mation is passed on by the current MMCE to that downstream correspondent, who then performs the
equivalent computation and passing of the information to its downstream correspondent. Finally, the
ultimate downstream correspondent - the sink - is told that an aircraft would nominally reach it at a
time equal to the current time plus the sum of the nominal times through all the appropriate branches
of all the intervening MMCEs.
At this point, the sink has to perform its own decision-making, which may include previously received
notifications of incoming aircraft. The result of this decision-making is a desired arrival time for that
aircraft, which may or not be the nominal arrival time. This information must then be made known to
all the MMCEe that the aircraft must traverse to get there. Since the sink only has communications
with the last MMCE, this element receives the desired arrival time at the sink for that aircraft.
Now, the process used to propagate the nominal arrival time downstream is reversed, in that the
MMCE's nominal transit times are subtracted from the desired arrival times before submission to the
next upstream correspondent. Finally, the first MMCE (the one currently "responsible" for that aircraft)
receives the time at which the aircraft should leave its exit gate so that, flying at the nominal speed
through the remaining MMCEs, it would arrive at the sink at the time that the sink desires it.
Actually, this 'upstream propagation" of information is not as symmetric with the downstream prop-
agation as I described it. Indeed, when propagating the information upstream, each MMCE has to
send it to its right or left upstream correspondent, as appropriate, a decision-making not required when
propagating the information downstream.
In the FTL implementation, the MMCE concept is used to drive a Radar Controller's display; in this
display, the MMCE's are made to correspond to actual converging ATC paths. After the upstream-
downstream passes describe before, the MMCE currently 'owning" and aircraft uses the desired exit
time information to display a "slot" in the screen which travels downstream along the MMCE's "nominal
path" at the right speed so as to arrive at each MMCE's exit gate at the desired time. In this way, each
controller is given an indication as to how early or late the aircraft is with respect to the ultimate sink's
wishes.
This display concept, or "conveyor belt" had been proposed before, although it has never been mecha-
nized, even experimentally, beyond the final approach path. It is clear that this kind of display could be
constructed without the need for MMCEs, downstream ripples, upstream ripples, and the like. But let
us examine the advantages of this "federated' logic approach, as opposed to some centralized algorithm.
Assume the MMCEs correspond to actual control responsibility areas - either on a one-to-one basis, or
several MMCEs to a controller position. Since all of the information flow occurs only between neighbors,
there is the opportunity for an MMCE to alter, or modify the information for its own purposes while it
passes through it. Assume, for example, that each MMCE keeps a record of all the scheduled desired
arrival times of aircraft at its entry gates as it propagates that information upstream. It could then
determine if the number of aircraft under its responsibility exceeds a certain value during a period
of time. This could be used to 'reject" the desired propagation times as it is "handed in' by the
downstream correspondent during the upstream portion of the cycle.
Similarly, what to do when an upstream correspondent rejects a proposed desired arrival time - in an
MMCE to MMCE transaction - could be based on local decision-making: if each MMCE also keeps
track of what desired time slots it has propagated upstream, it may attempt to swap the rejected slot
with a slot that was previously propagated through the other branch of the MMCE. Thus, a bargaining
process very similar to to-day's handoff bargaining could be performed.
While the development of this abstraction does not imply its computer mechanization - it could be
mechanized, for example, as a series of controller-to-controller interactions - we are able to simulate
them, and therefore perform experiments with them, using software objects in Lisp in FTL's symbolic
ATC simulator. A number of instances of sources, sinks, and MMCE's can be created, liked, and
positioned interactively. Image objects corresponding to the MMCEs nominal paths and the previously
described slots are created and manipulated as easily as numbers on a calculator or characters on a
word processing system.
9. A DISTANT DREAM: THE CONTROLLER'S ASSISTANT
Finally, and as an example of a truly long-term possible application of Artificial Intelligence technology
to Air Traffic Control, I would like to propose to you the idea of a "personalized controller's assistant".
This device would consist of a knowledge base made up of four parts: a 'general" part reflecting the
generic kind of controller know-how that would be reflected, for example, in the Controller's Handbook,
or in training material; a second part, at a higher priority level than the first, would include 'position-
dependent" knowledge, such as the route and airway structure pertinent to that facility, letters of
agreement between facilities, and the like; the third part would include the daily weather, notam and
similar information, while the last part be made up of the individual controller's preferences and personal
techniques.
Exactly what functions such a system could perform is not very clear at this time; one possibility is to
act as a "dummy" of the controller, that is, display for his benefit what control actions the clone would
take. By periodically observing that "dummy controller" the human controller could detect his own
blunders - specially missed control actions - early enough to take effective corrective action.
If such a feature is to be a real help, rather than an additional burden, it is likely that the display of such
'dummy directives" would have to be at a rather high level of abstraction; for example, rather than the
'clone" displaying the command "TW611 turn right heading 220", to which the human controller may
think "Why is he doing that?", the display should read something like 'I would like to send TW611
west to make him a little late on his turn to final, or else he's going to be to close to that heavy ahead
of him".
The key characteristic of such a system would be its personalization capabilities: personalization with
respect to the position being assisted, the current weather, navaid and traffic information, and, most
important, the individual controller. The controller's individual knowledge base could, presumably,
be part of his personal equipment for the duration of his career; if I may be allowed to dream for
a few instants, I can imagine the days when the controller, upon taking over a position from the
previous person, would insert his or her magnetically-coded i.d. card on the console, to indicate to the
system that his personal knowledge base is to be used; this knowledge base would replace the previous
controller's personal set of rules, and interact with the facility's rule set, as well as the "knowledge of
the day" which was entered by the same shift supervisor that briefed the incoming controller on the
day's situation. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between one element of the knowledge base
and the controller's basic training, knowledge of the local environment, personal controlling style, and
knowledge of the current traffic, weather and facilities situation.
What the form of this knowledge would have will have to wait for the appropriate knowledge engineering
to be performed; I can only venture to suggest that it will involve abstract concepts both intuitively
obvious to the human and manipulable by the computer, similar to the 'geographic location" and
'intersection" objects of our symbolic Air Traffic Control simulator. The collection of abstractions
- which would include both objects AND actions - would in effect create a rich, unambiguous and
intuitively attractive language which could be useful not only for humans and machines to communicate,
but even for human-to-human communications, much in the same way that the language Lisp is to-day
used not only to program, but also to describe logical process in scientific publications.
The same uncertainty about how knowledge would be represented in such a system also applies to what
kind of 'inference engine" or rule-processing logic it should have; to begin with, several simultaneous
goals may be required, and these goals may be more complex than the simple diagnosis-seeking of
MYCIN or the runway configuration change program of Tower Chief. Certainly, to-day's Expert System
technology is not sufficient to achieve this functionality, and you should mistrust anybody who claims
so. But I strongly feel that we should look for desired effects, influenced by what we expect will be the
capabilities of technology in the future, and then look for the specific technology required to achieve
them, rather that try to find applications for an existing technology that appears to be 'a solution
looking for a problem".
10. A FINAL CAVEAT
As ambiguous as all these promises are, they appear to hold a lot of promises for performance that we
know cannot be achieved by to-days computational techniques. It is also fair, however, to point out some
potential problems, principally that of software verification and validation. A significant part of the cost
of to-day's software is associated with achieving a satisfactory degree of confidence that the behavior
of the software in a system as critical as the Air Traffic Control system will be "correct". The cost of
this validation increases, of course as the complexity of the desired behavior increases; the problem with
the "personalized algorithm" I just described is not only that its behavior is radically more complex
than that of any software ever used in Air Traffic Control automation, but that its behavior cannot, by
definition, be completely known and specified a-priori!
This problem is not unique to the "controller clone" idea; indeed, imprecise a-priori knowledge of the
behavior of the system seems to be a fundamental feature of most AI-oriented devices. What is the
solution, then? Abandon this class of software as untestable? Abandon the notion that we can validate
the software to be used in Air Traffic Control? Both extremes seem unjustified to me. I believe that a
new concept of "software reliability' must be developed, a concept more sophisticated than just the idea
that *it meets the prescribed specifications'. For example, the notion of a "software defect" could be
organized in various categories: category one would be a software defect that simply and catastrophically
causes the entire system to stop functioning. Probably we can devise methods for testing against that
type of bug, no matter how complex the software and the expert system rules become.
A second category of bug would involve a less than perfect solution to a problem (such as not finding
a solution to a specific problem). In this case, it is clear to the user that the system is not functioning
properly in that particular instance, but in all likelihood it will function properly on the next problem.
This I would categorize more as a performance limitation of the technology than a real 'bug", and the
difficulty here is that we cannot predict - therefore specify - what the performance of an A. I.-based
product will or should be; we will have to learn to live with this type of software deficiencies. A final,
and perhaps the most devastating type of "bug would be one which involves a definite malfunction
whose effects, however, are not immediately apparent to the user. Such a defect, for instance, would
involve making decisions about an aircraft on final approach using data pertaining to another aircraft
on final approach; since the aircraft are in similar situations, the control actions suggested may look
reasonable for the aircraft in question - even though they were based on information about the wrong
aircraft.
How would one protect itself from such defects? Perhaps a way out would be to implement software
redundancy in the same way as today we implement hardware redundancy to protect against hardware
malfunctions. The notion of redundant software is, however, very different from that of hardware
redundancy: while two identical ILS receivers do offer a significant amount of protection against receiver
failure, two copies of the same program offers NO protection against a programming bug; indeed,
programs (or, in the case of A. I. products, the rules or other language-data that determines the
behavior of the program) must be independently developed, implemented, and tested, to offer any
degree of protection.
We are at the very infancy of software redundancy; indeed, with to-day's programming technology,
exhaustive validation and verification is cheaper than redundant software development. With the next
generation software technology and systems complexity, is it possible that redundant software develop-
ment may be the cheapest way - or maybe the only way - of gaining confidence in critical software.
And this is all for today; before I conclude, I would like to point out that I have mentioned only ideas de-
veloped at M.I.T.'s Flight Transportation Laboratory. Other organizations are actively exploring other
ATC applications of A. I. technology; I would like to mention in particular the work on Tactical conflict
resolution at MITRE, and Weather Radar feature recognition and extraction at Lincoln Laboratory.
To summarize, I believe that Artificial Intelligence is a source of extremely powerful tools and ideas, and
in particular, opens up a new viewpoint on the use of computers for any kind of application; one should
not expect miracles from this technology in the near future, except perhaps in the areas of software
productivity and simulation technology. I would like to compare the state of A. I. today, with that of
the transistor in the late 1950's. At that time, there was little a transistor could do that could not be
done with vacuum tubes. Admittedly, the transistor was a little smaller and used a little less power than
a vacuum tube, but in many respects, such as frequency response, it was, in fact, inferior. Yet to-day,
it would be a little hard for me to walk around with a wrist watch that computes inverse trigonometric
functions if it were built with vacuum tubes, even if I had a long enough extension cord! So, sometimes
between 1960 and 1985, the mere quantitative advantage that the transistor had over the vacuum tube
was transformed into an insuperable qualitative advantage. Perhaps we will wake up some day in the
year 2000 and realize that sometime between 1985 and then, the mere quantitative differences between
Artificial Intelligence and conventional use of computers was also transformed.
But we should be very careful not to demand that this transition occur within a designated period
of time. If, in 1957, Doctor Schockley would have been required, in order to continue work with his
invention, to show a use of the transistor that could not be performed with a vacuum tube, he just might
have given up and gone home. Let us be careful not to require a similar performance from Artificial
Intelligence, or we may loose one of the most significant intellectual developments of mankind since the
printing press. Thank you very much.
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---------- PATIENT-i ----------
1) Patient's name: (first-last)
*** Fred Smith
2) Sex
*** Male
3) Age:
*** 65
4) Have you been able to obtain positive cultures from a site
at which Fred Smith has an infection?
*** yes
---------- INFECTION-1 ----------
5) What is the infection?
** Primary-bacteremia
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6) Please give the date and approximate time when signs or
symptoms of the primary-bacteremia (infection-1) first appeared
(mo/da/yr)
* May 6 1980
The most recent positive culture associated with the
primary-bacteremia (infection-1) will be referred to as:
---------- CULTURE-1 ----------
7) From what site was the specimen for culture-1 taken?
*** Blood
8) Please give the date and time when this blood culture
(culture-1) was obtained. (mo/da/yr)
*** May 9 1980
The first significant organism from this blood culture
(culture-1) will be referred to as:
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---------- ORGANISM-i ----------
9) Enter the identity of organism-1:
*** unknown I-
10) Is organism-1 a rod or coccus:
*** rod
11) The gram stain of organism-1:
**o gramneg
12) Have there been positive cultures from sites which are NOT
associated with infections about which you are seeking advice?
*c no
13) Did organism-1 grow aerobically?
e*c yes (0.8)
14) Did organism-1 grow anaerobically
*** yes
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16) What is the suspected portal of entry of organism-1 into
this sterile site?
*** CI (0.6)
My therapy recommendation will be based on the following
probable infection(s) and potential causative organism(s):
INFECTION-i is PRIMARY-BACTEREMIA
<Item 1> The identity of organism-i may be PSEUDONONAS-AERUGINOSA
<Item 2> The identity of organism-1 may be KLEBSIELLA-PNEUNONIAE
<Item 3> The identity of organism-1 may be E.COLI
<Item 4> The identity of organism-1 may be BACTEROIDES-FRAGILIS
<Item 6> The identity of organism-1 may be ENTEROBACTER
<Item 6> The identity of organism-1 may be PROTEUS-NON-MIRABILIS
46) On a scale of 0 to 4, where higher numbers indicate
increasing severity, how would you rate Fred Smith's degree
of sickness?
* 3
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47) Does Fred Smith have a clinically significant allergic
reaction to any antimicrobial agent?
*** no
48) Fred Smith's weight in kilograms (or <number> pounds):
*** 70
(Rec 1) Ny preferred therapy recommendation is as follows:
In order to cover for Items <1 2 3 6 8>:
Give: GENTANICIN
Dose: 119 mg (1.7 mg/kg) q8h IV [or IN) for 10 days
Comments: Modify dose in renal failure
In order to cover for Item <4>
Give: CLINDANYCIN
Dose: 695 mg (8.6 mg/kg) qh IV [or IN) for 14 days
Comments: If diarrhea or other GI symptoms develop.
patient should be evaluated for possible
pseudomembranous colitis.
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COQACLUS c)AJ "If 1) the infection is primary-bacteremia, and
2) the site of the culture is one of the
sterile sites, and
3) the suspected portal of entry of the organism
is the gastrointestinal tract,
Then there is sufficient evidence (0.7) that the
identity of the organism is bacteraides.")
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RULE-1 (AIRCRAFT1, RUNWAY1):
"IF AIRCRAFT1 IS-TRYING-TO-LAND-AT RUNWAY1
~' IS TRUE AND
AIRCRAFT1 IS-CLEARED-FOR-APPROACH-TO
RUNWAY1 IS FALSE THEN
'' ALERT USER"
RULE-2 (AIRCRAFT1, RUNWAY1):
"IF AIRCRAFT1 IS-CLOSE-TO RUNWAY1 AND
ABS (AIRCRAFT1 COURSE - RUNWAY1 HEADING)
LESS THAN t AND
ABS ((RELATIVE-BEARING (AIRCRAFT1 POSITION)(RUNWAY1 TDZ)) -
RUNWAY1 HEADING) LESS THAN . AWD
AIRCRAFT1 ALTITUDE-AGL LESS THAN 1500 THEN
ASSERT AIRCRAFT1 IS-TRYING-TO-LAND-AT
RUNAWAY1 TRUE"
RULE-3 (AIRCRAFT1): ASSERT AIRCRAFT1 COURSE TAN-1 (X 1 +2 + x3)
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